We’re calling it: The war in Ukraine has entered a new phase.
@KatStepanenko and I have authored a new special report studying how Ukraine is actively challenging the positional character of the war that has dominated the battlefield since 2023.
Data on Russia’s battlefield performance indicates that the character of the war is shifting in favor of Ukrainian forces – at least for now. Russian forces rates of advances are stagnating while Ukrainian forces are employing novel tactics and operational concepts in efforts to break out of positional warfare.
Neither Russia nor Ukraine can conduct operational maneuvers yet, however.
The bottom line is that the war in Ukraine is competitive and far from stalemated. Ukrainian forces are out-innovating Russian forces in both military technologies and in applying these new technologies in effective operational concepts that can help Ukrainian forces break out of positional warfare.
Ukraine is employing mechanized equipment in tactical maneuvers in ways that were impossible 12 months ago. Russia’s ability to conduct infiltration missions will likely continue to degrade as Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign pushes Russia’s logistics and forward operating bases further away from the frontlines, reducing resourcing to sustain infantry tasked with infiltration missions.
Ukraine may be able to scale these effects if they resourced properly by international partners. Ukraine’s advantage in intermediate range strikes is notably not permanent, and Russia will very likely eventually develop countermeasures to mitigate Ukraine’s advantages.
[MY COMMENT: This is rather optimistic because the Russian army seems very disorganized and dysfunctional at present, mainly because they are feeding false stories of success to Putin and for as long as Putin thinks everything is fine they will find it difficult to get the resources to fix anything]
Ukraine’s international partners thus have a rare and temporary opportunity to help Ukraine exploit favorable battlefield dynamics while Ukraine has the upper hand. Key Points of the report:
• Russia’s rate of advance is plummeting during the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
[Russia barely advances at all]
• Russia is losing more soldiers to make fewer gains, with monthly Russian casualty rates reportedly outpacing monthly recruitment since December 2025.
• Ukraine is starting to regain more ground than it is losing for the first time since 2023.
[That’s for the last two months]
• Ukraine’ recent counterattacks feature unique characteristics and deviate from key trends that defined the positional character of the war since 2023.
• Ukraine is conducting a pattern of more frequent mechanized counterattacks at the tactical level for the first time since 2023.
[I.e. Ukraine is now using armoured vehicles in what should be the killing zone - which means very good counter drone protection on their side]
• The Ukrainian command’s operational planning is maturing.
• Ukraine’s early 2026 counterattacks in the south were successful likely due to better planning and preparation of the battlefield.
• Ukraine has been conducting a coherent campaign to suppress and destroy Russian air defenses since late 2025, in order to shape the battlefield as part of more sophisticated campaign planning.
[I.e. Russian air defences are now so battered that Ukraine can do things it couldn’t do before]
• Ukraine significantly intensified its intermediate-range strike campaign against dynamic targets in Spring 2026 in order to degrade Russian logistics at operational depths ahead of planned Ukrainian maneuver.
[By dynamic targets they mean that Ukraine is attacking things that move like trucks and railway carriages, and other logistics]
• Ukrainian forces started actively disrupting Russian railway logistics in occupied Ukraine and Russian western regions in Spring 2026.
[Examples of what they mean, the railway logistics]
• Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes are already achieving notable operational effects, including degrading Russia’s ability to use the key Russian highway connecting Russia to occupied Crimea and GLOCs [Ground LInes Of Communications] around Donetsk City.
[Also trucks]
• Ukrainian forces decisively seized the initiative in intermediate-range strikes by fielding new technologies such as the US-made Hornet strike UAV, among other systems.
[It’s particularly fixed wing Hornet fpv drones which can fly much further]
• Ukrainian forces are achieving temporary tactical drone overmatch in some frontline sectors, which is slowing Russian offensive operations by degrading the effectiveness of Russian shaping operations.
[I.e. Ukraine has so many drones it can now overpower the Russian drones in places along the front line]
• Ukrainian forces likely achieved tactical drone overmatch in certain frontline sectors after degrading Russia’s drone capabilities in late 2025 to early 2026 - primarily by suppressing drone launch positions and increasingly intercepting Russian tactical UAVs.
[They do it by destroying drones and their launchers before they can take off and destroying Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the air]
• Ukraine’s degradation of Russian forces at operational depth combined with tactical-level drone overmatch likely is creating vulnerabilities in the Russian lines.
[All this is creating vulnerabilities in the Russian front lines for Ukraine to take advantage of]
• Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign is likely far from its zenith, assuming continued support from Ukraine’s partners, and will likely intensify over 2026 as Ukraine fields new weapons capable of striking Russian’s operational rear.
[ISW is saying the intermediate-range strikes will likely keep increaseing with enough support from it’s partners - actually also a lot of this is indigenous within Ukraine it’s no longer dependent on technology of its partners especially for drones, it’s even exporting drones for instance to the Middle east and it’s in partnerships with other countries making drones jointly with them]
