PeteWatson Oh the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is far harder to block. Iran can’t block it. The Houthi could try but they are not nearly as strong as Iran is and they have pretty much kept out of the Iran war unlike Hezbollah. They did fire some drones and cruise missiles towards Israel in March but never joined the war.
This is at the end of March:
QUOTE STARTS
Brigadier-General Yahya Saree, a military spokesperson for the Houthis, announced on Saturday the Iranian-backed group’s first attack on Israel. On Sunday, he said the Houthis had carried out a “second military operation” against Israel using cruise missiles and drones and said the Houthis would continue carrying out military operations in the coming days until Israel “ceases its attacks and aggression”.
So far, unlike Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraqi armed groups, the Houthis have not made any formal announcement of joining the war.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/29/houthis-open-new-front-in-iran-war-will-yemeni-group-block-bab-al-mandeb
The Houthis are Shia but they don’t see the Supreme Leader of Iran as their spiritual leader unlike Hezbollah.
QUOTE STARTS
While Iran champions the Houthis as part of its “axis of resistance”, Houthi religious doctrine does not adhere to Iran’s supreme leader in the same way Hezbollah’s and the Iraqi groups’ do.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/29/houthis-open-new-front-in-iran-war-will-yemeni-group-block-bab-al-mandeb
The Bab al-Mandeb Strait is between Yemen and Djibouti and there are many foreign navies stationed in Djibouti which hosts them - anti piracy and to protect shipping in the Middle East.
The Houthis are rebels in Yemen rather than being the ruling regime there. They do control part of the Yemen but their government is opposed to them.
So they don’t have the support level of the IRGC and they don’t have the infrastructure they have or the military capabilities or supplies. They do have some drones and missiles. But nowhere near Iran.
Also the Houthis are in a ceasefire with Saudi Arabia which they benefit from financially. So they have a strong financial disincentive to get involved. Saudi Arabia spends billions of US dollars a year on Yemeni civil servant salaries and some of that goes to the salaries of civil servants in the Houthi controlled area of the country. They would be in a difficult economic position if Saudi Arabia cut that off.
QUOTE STARTS
The Houthis are unlikely to attack Gulf energy infrastructure or Red Sea shipping, however, as doing so would jeopardize their domestic position. An expanded campaign would jeopardize the Houthis’ relationship with Saudi Arabia, which would undermine the group’s already-fragile economic position. The Houthis secured a favorable UN-brokered ceasefire with Saudi Arabia in 2022 that they are hesitant to break. Saudi Arabia spends billions of US dollars annually paying for Yemeni civil servant salaries, including in some Houthi-controlled areas, as part of the ceasefire.[
The cessation of these salary transfers would fuel unrest in Houthi-controlled areas, especially as military operations and sanctions have already severely weakened the Houthi economy in recent years.[17] The Houthis have also demanded other financial concessions from Saudi Arabia as part of future peace talks, including Saudi reparations and reconstruction investment, as well as the Saudi-backed Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) paying all public-sector salaries in Houthi-controlled areas.
The US also did major attacks on the Houthis in 2024 and 2025 and they are very reluctant to get their attention again.
QUOTE STARTS
Fear of US retaliation has likely deterred the Houthis from resuming Red Sea attacks and likely continues to influence Houthi decision-making in the Iran war. The US air campaign did not eliminate Houthi capabilities entirely, and the Houthis have rebuilt in the months since, but the continued lack of Red Sea attacks since September 2025 indicates that the Houthis are so far unwilling to absorb the costs of resuming the group’s attack campaign.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/houthi-escalation-calculus-following-cautious-entry-into-the-iran-war/
ISW ends saying that the Houthis wouldn’t want to do a limited campaign that achieved little as it would reduce their influence and power that got them favorable terms in the 2022 ceasefire.
Also blocking the Red Sea is different from the Hormuz Strait. The countries to the north like Saudi Arabia and others on the Red Sea can continue to trade to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic via the Suez Canal.
The ones to the south can trade to the Pacific via the Gulf of Aiden.
It’s a major shortcut for trade from the Pacific to / from Europe and other countries on the Atlantic. But container ships can sail all the way around the cape of good hope and so long as the cargo isn’t perishable it means a delayed delivery but not that huge a mark up in prices.
It’s not like the Persian gulf that’s completely blocked off with hundreds of ships stuck there that can’t go anywhere until it’s unblocked.
So - harder to block, much weaker military, benefit from the 2022 ceasefire they don’t want to break, and it wouldn’t have as big an effect even if they did cut shipping - it would be significant but not as serious as the Hormuz Strait.
And it’s very unlikely they really do it.
